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In stochastic dynamical systems, different concepts of stability can be obtained in different limits. A particu-
larly interesting example is evolutionary game theory, which is traditionally based on infinite populations, where
strict Nash equilibria correspond to stable fixed points that are always evolutionarily stable. However, in finite
populations stochastic effects can drive the system away from strict Nash equilibria, which gives rise to a new
concept for evolutionary stability. The conventional and the new stability concepts may apparently contradict
each other leading to conflicting predictions in large yet finite populations. We show that the two concepts can
be derived from the frequency dependent Moran process in different limits. Our results help to determine the
appropriate stability concept in large finite populations. The general validity of our findings is demonstrated
showing that the same results are valid employing vastly different co-evolutionary processes.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 89.65.-s 05.45.-a, 02.50.Ey
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory [1] provides a powerful and uni-
fying mathematical framework widely used in scientific ar-
eas as diverse as biology [2], economics [3], and social sci-
ences. More recently, it has been attracting growing interest
in physics [4, 5, 6], as several sophisticated techniques devel-
oped in the physics of complex systems have provided use-
ful insights into this interdisciplinary framework [7]. Origi-
nally, evolutionary game theory was formulated in terms of
infinite populations and the corresponding replicator dynam-
ics [8, 9]. As a nonlinear dynamical system, these equations
are of great interest being formally equivalent to the well stud-
ied Lotka-Volterra equations [9] . Much of our present intu-
ition is based upon this deterministic framework that analyzes
nonlinear systems of ordinary differential equations. How-
ever, any real population has finite size and also individual-
based computer simulations in unstructured or structured pop-
ulations [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] always deal with finite
populations. As is well known in physics, the behavior of a
finite system can depart significantly from its infinite counter-
part.
Recently, the concept of evolutionary stability has been
specifically investigated for finite populations [17, 18] and
the traditional concept of evolutionary stability has been chal-
lenged. Analyzing the connection between the two frame-
works of evolutionary stability we show that the difference
between them is not solely based on finite size effects.
When selection is frequency independent, the idea of evo-
lutionary stability is simple: A population evolves until a sta-
ble fixed point is reached at which fitness is maximized. In
contrast with this situation, in evolutionary game theory the
fitness of an individual depends on the type and frequency of
its competitors. Hence, the optimization of individual fitness
can even lead to the decline of the average fitness, as in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma where each individual is better off not co-
operating, although mutual cooperation leads to higher fitness
[19].
The standard definition of evolutionary stability formulated
for infinite populations [1] is equivalent to strong stability of
the corresponding fixed point in the replicator dynamics [9]:
A strategy is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if indi-
viduals with this strategy are always better off than a small
fraction of mutants. A similar result holds for infinite popu-
lations subject to external noise: In the stochastic replicator
dynamics of Fudenberg and Harris [20], the population stays
nearly all the time close to an ESS if the ESS corresponds to
an interior state or if the payoff matrix satisfies a certain def-
initeness condition [21]. Moreover, in the stochastic replica-
tor dynamics, strict Nash equilibria are always asymptotically
stochastically stable, provided the impact of the external noise
is not too strong. However, for finite populations the con-
cept of evolutionary stability has been challenged, as an ESS
defined as above is not necessarily stable anymore whenever
the population size is finite [17]. Nowak et al. introduced a
concept for evolutionary stability in finite populations (ESSN)
proposing the additional requirement that selection has to op-
pose replacement by other strategies due to random drift [17].
For coordination games corresponding to bistable situations,
they also derived the condition under which selection favors
the replacement of one strict Nash equilibrium by the other.
They found that replacement occurs if the unstable fixed point
that is always present in coordination games is closer than
1/3 to the strategy to be replaced. This finding obtained for
weak selection contradicts the idea of evolutionary stability
in infinite populations, where such a replacement cannot oc-
cur. Furthermore, even in simulations of finite populations
such a replacement has not been demonstrated yet, as selec-
tion is usually strong in these systems. Here we show that
these two apparently contradicting concepts actually emerge
as different limiting results of a unified treatment. Both the
traditional ESS concept and the ESSN concept can be derived
from the frequency dependent Moran process in different lim-
its. However, these results do not rely on Moran dynamics.
Indeed, their general validity is shown to apply to other types
of co-evolutionary dynamics, such as the frequency depen-
dent Wright-Fisher process [22] and the local update process
investigated in [23].
2The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Sec. II, we introduce the frequency dependent Moran process
and discuss how different limits lead to different concepts of
evolutionary stability. In Secs. III and IV, we show how the
results transfer to the Local update process and the frequency
dependent Wright-Fisher process. Finally, we discuss impli-
cations on the fixation times in Sec. V.
II. THE FREQUENCY DEPENDENT MORAN PROCESS
In evolutionary game theory, the fitness of an individual is
determined by the payoff from its interactions with others. An
A individual will obtain a payoff a from an interaction with A
individuals and b fromB individuals. Similarly,B individuals
gain c from A and d from B. Hence, the payoffs are given by
piA = a
i− 1
N − 1
+ b
N − i
N − 1
(1)
piB = c
i
N − 1
+ d
N − i− 1
N − 1
(2)
for the types A and B, respectively. N is the population size
and i is the number of A individuals in the population. Self-
interactions have been excluded. For the frequency depen-
dent Moran process [17], the fitness of an individual is a lin-
ear combination of a background fitness and the payoff from
interactions, fA = 1 − w + wpiA for A individuals and anal-
ogously for B. The parameter 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 measures the in-
tensity of selection. For w ≪ 1, selection is weak and the
payoff of the game has only a marginal influence, whereas the
background fitness becomes negligible for w → 1.
We assume that the fitness is always positive. An individ-
ual chosen proportional to its fitness produces one identical
offspring which replaces a randomly chosen individual. The
probability to increase the number of A individuals from i to
i+ 1 is
T+(i) =
i fA
i fA + (N − i)fB
N − i
N
, (3)
whereas the probability to decrease it from i to i− 1 is
T−(i) =
(N − i)fB
ifA + (N − i)fB
i
N
. (4)
Since T−(N) = 0 and T+(0) = 0, this process has absorbing
states at i = 0 and i = N . For large N , the Master equa-
tion describing this process can be approximated by a Fokker-
Planck equation with drift a(x) ≈ T+(x) − T−(x) and dif-
fusion b2(x) ≈ (T+(x) + T−(x))/N , where x = i/N is the
fraction of type A in the population [23]. This Fokker-Planck
equation corresponds to the stochastic differential equation
dx = a(x)dt + b(x)dW (t), (5)
where W (t) is the Wiener process, 〈W (s)W (t)〉 = min(s, t)
[24]. For the frequency dependent Moran process, we have
a(x) ≈ x(1− x)
fA(x) − fB(x)
xfA(x) + (1− x)fB(x)
(6)
b2(x) ≈
x(1− x)
N
fA(x) + fB(x)
xfA(x) + (1− x)fB(x)
. (7)
For fixed selection intensity w and N → ∞, b(x) vanishes
and a deterministic replicator equation is obtained from the
frequency dependent Moran process [23]. In this determinis-
tic limit, a stable coexistence of A and B is possible.
However, if Nw ≪ 1, the stochasticity is retained even in
the limit of infinite population size and the system will eventu-
ally get absorbed in the state x = 0 or x = 1. The probability
that the system gets absorbed in x = 1 starting from x0 (in
other words, the probability to reach the state with A individ-
uals only) can be computed from the drift and diffusion term
as
φ(x0) =
S(x0)
S(1)
where S(x) =
∫ x
0
e−
∫
y
0
Γ(z)dzdy, (8)
and Γ(z) = 2a(z)/b2(z) [25]. It is noteworthy that there
are similarities between our absorption probabilities Eq. (8)
and the results of Ref. [26] in which a quantum description of
game dynamics has been explored.
For neutral selection, w = 0, the drift term vanishes,
a(z) = 0, and the fixation probability is simply the initial
fraction of type A, φ(x0) = x0. For w ≪ 1, the ratio Γ(z)
that determines the fixation properties of the process becomes
Γ(z) ≈ Nw(piA − piB) = Nw (αz + β) , (9)
where α = (a− b− c+ d)N/(N − 1) and β = (−a+ bN −
dN + d)/(N − 1). A particular interesting case is Nw ≪ 1,
in which the fixation probability Eq. (8) is given by
φ(x) ≈ x+
w
6
Nx(1− x) (α(1 + x) + 3β) . (10)
For x = 1/N , this reduces to the fixation probability of a sin-
gle mutant in the limit of weak selection, which has been com-
puted directly from the Moran process in [17]. Selection fa-
vorsA replacingB if the fixation probability of a singleAmu-
tant is higher than the fixation probability of a neutral mutant,
which amounts to φ(x) > x. For the evolutionary stability of
the state with B individuals only, the condition φ(x) > x is
of interest in the vicinity of x = 0. After derivation with re-
spect to x we find for x = 0 the condition S(1) < S′(0) = 1.
For N → ∞ and w → 0 with Nw ≪ 1, the development of
S(1) < 1 reduces to a+ 2b > c+ 2d.
For a > c and b > d, the fitness of A is larger than the
fitness of B for any number of mutants. In this case, the con-
dition S(1) < 1 is always fulfilled and A will invade the pop-
ulation with a higher probability than a neutral mutant. On the
other hand, for a < c and b < d, the strategy A is disadvanta-
geous and the probability for its invasion is smaller than that
of a neutral mutant. However, the most interesting case is as-
sociated with those situations in which piA− piB changes sign
for a certain x. Here, we concentrate on coordination games
in which a > c and b < d. In these games, the situation
with 100% A or 100% B individuals are strict Nash equilib-
ria: If the population is dominated by type A, a B mutant is
disadvantageous, but if B dominates, A individuals become
disadvantageous. Coordination games are bistable, i.e. for an
intermediate number of mutants the preferred direction of the
3evolutionary process changes, as the drift term a(x) changes
sign. Whereas in the deterministic replicator equation x = 0
and x = 1 are stable fixed points, stochasticity can lead from
one point to the other, similar to a physical process in which
stochastic fluctuations enable a particle to overcome an en-
ergy barrier. In asymmetric situations, stochasticity favors
one equilibrium over the other, depending on the position of
the unstable fixed point x∗ between them. When this point is
close to 0, it is relatively easy forA to invade, as a small group
of A individuals changes the sign of the drift term a(x). More
specifically, for a > c and b < d selection favors A replacing
B if
x∗ =
d− b
a− b− c+ d
<
1
3
(11)
where x∗ is the unstable equilibrium of the game at which the
fitness of both strategies is the same, piA = piB . This result
coined as 1/3-rule by Nowak et al. can be derived directly
from the exact fixation probabilities of the Markov chain and
is valid for Nw ≪ 1. It is a central result of the ESSN con-
cept [17]. It can also be obtained in the same limit from Eq.
(10) with x = 1/N . Furthermore, Eq. (10) shows that this
1/3-rule extends beyond the case of a single mutant and is
also obtained if the fixation probability of a fixed number of
mutants is investigated.
In general, the stochasticity arising from finite populations
is qualitatively different from the Gaussian noise incorporated
in Eq. (5). Therefore, it is remarkable that the approximation
of population dynamics in finite populations with stochastic
differential equations agree for weak selection perfectly with
the direct calculation for arbitrary N , although the Langevin
approximation implicitly assumes large populations. How-
ever, if w remains bounded away from zero, we can no longer
assume Nw ≪ 1 for N →∞ and the 1/3-rule is violated, as
illustrated in Fig. 1. In this case, we obtain for w ≪ 1
S(1) ≈
∫ 1
0
exp
[
−Nw
∫ y
0
(αx + β) dx
]
dy (12)
=
√
pi
2α
1
Nw
ez
2
0 [erf (z1)− erf (z0)] ,
where erf (x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
dy e−y
2 is the error function and
zi = (αi + β)
√
Nw/(2α). For coordination games with
a > c and b < d, the right hand side of Eq. (12) diverges
for N → ∞ and fixed w ≪ 1. Therefore, S(1) > 1 and
selection never favors A replacing B in this setting. As B
and A are ESS in coordination games, this is exactly what
the traditional evolutionary stability predicts. Hence, we have
shown that evolutionary stability depends on the quantityNw,
i.e. the size of the population times the intensity of selec-
tion. Nw ≪ 1 leads to the ESSN concept from [17], whereas
Nw ≫ 1 reveals the traditional ESS concept [1]. There is no
contradiction between these notions of evolutionary stability:
They both constitute two extreme limits of the quantity Nw.
Indeed, as explicitly shown in the next two Sections, this re-
sult does not depend on the frequency dependent Moran pro-
cess adopted so far.
For intermediate values of Nw, the position of the unstable
equilibrium x∗ such that selection favors the replacement of
B by A can be solved numerically from S(1) = 1 for a given
payoff matrix, as shown in Fig. 1. For x < x∗ selection fa-
vors replacement of B by A, for x > x∗ this replacement is
not favored. Eq. (12) depends on the payoffs as a function of
α and β and not only as function of x∗. Therefore, there is
no universal relation analog to the 1/3-rule for fixed Nw. In
general, the position of the unstable equilibrium will depend
on all entries in the payoff matrix and not only on a certain
combination of them. In Fig. 1, one parameter of the payoff
matrix is varied and the resulting position of x∗ is shown. For
coordination games (a > c and d > b) with d > a, B is
a Pareto optimal equilibrium that maximizes payoffs, as the
equilibrium with A players only yields a lower payoff. Fur-
thermore, the condition a − c > d − b implies that A is risk
dominant, i.e. equilibrium A has a larger basin of attraction
than B. If the level of stochasticity is small, Nw ≫ 1, re-
placement of the Pareto optimal equilibrium only occurs if the
basin of attraction of this equilibrium is very small. For high
stochasticity, Nw ≪ 1, replacement of the Pareto optimal by
the Risk dominant equilibrium is much more likely.
We note that we do not consider a thermodynamical limit
here, as the properties of the system are not conserved. A
more detailed account on the thermodynamical limit of the
frequency dependent Moran process is given in [27].
III. THE LOCAL UPDATE PROCESSES
To demonstrate the general validity of our result for evolu-
tionary stability, we show that the two limits Nw ≪ 1 and
Nw ≫ 1 lead to the same result for two vastly different pro-
cesses. In this Section, we consider the local update process
discussed in [23]. In this process, two individuals are chosen
at random from the population. Only the choice of two differ-
ent individuals can change the composition of the population.
In mixed pairs, theA individual replaces theB individual with
probability
p =
1
2
+
w
2
piA − piB
∆pi
, (13)
where ∆pi is the maximum possible payoff difference. The B
individual replaces the A individual with probability 1−p. As
for the Moran process,w determines the intensity of selection:
For small w, stochastic effects are frequent, whereas w → 1
leads to strong selection. This process is described by the
transition probabilities
T±(i) =
i
N
N − i
N
(
1
2
±
w
2
piA − piB
∆pi
)
. (14)
Again, the birth-death process can be approximated by a
stochastic differential equation, where the drift a(x) and the
diffusion b(x) are given by [23]
a(x) ≈ x(1 − x)
w
∆pi
[piA(x) − piB(x)] (15)
b2(x) ≈ x(1 − x)/N. (16)
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FIG. 1: (color online) The favored equilibrium in a bistable situation
given by a coordination game depends on the position of the unstable
equilibrium x∗. Here, the position of x∗ for which selection in finite
populations favors the replacement of the Pareto optimal equilibrium
B (with the higher payoff) by the risk dominant strategy A (with a
larger basin of attraction) is computed numerically for different N
and fixed w = 0.001. x∗ is shifting towards the pure B strategy with
increasing Nw, i.e. decreasing degree of stochasticity. For Nw ≪ 1,
the equilibrium has to be at x∗ ≤ 1/3 for A to replace B irrespective
of the process at stake (the local update process, the Moran process,
or the frequency dependent Wright-Fisher process). For Nw → ∞
the equilibrium converges to the pure B strategy, as expected for the
replicator dynamics where selection never favors A replacing B if
B is a stable fixed point. Although these limiting results hold for
all three processes, the position of x∗ will depend on the specific
co-evolutionary process and the payoff matrix (a = 1, b = 0, c =
3− 2/x∗ < −3, d = 2, w = 0.001).
In this case, Γ(x) = 2Nw(αx+ β)/∆pi , which is linear in x
for arbitrary intensity of selection w. Hence, we can compute
the fixation probability Eq. (8) explicitly,
φ(x) ≈
erf [ζ(x)] − erf [ζ(0)]
erf [ζ(1)]− erf [ζ(0)]
, (17)
where ζ(x) = (αx + β)
√
Nw/(α∆pi). For weak selection
w ≪ 1, the expansion of the error functions in Eq. (17) leads
to Eq. (10) again with w → 2w/∆pi. For x = 1/N , this re-
duces exactly to the result derived directly from the Markov
chain in [23]. Again, we can ask under which circumstances
selection favors A replacing B. Since Γ(x) is up to a constant
factor identical to the corresponding function for the Moran
process for weak selection, Eq. (12) is again obtained for the
local update process. However, here it is valid for any selec-
tion intensity w.
For Nw ≪ 1, Eq. (11) is recovered again. Hence, the
1/3-rule is valid for weak selection even for the local update
process.
However, for Nw ≫ 1 selection will never favor A replac-
ing B in a coordination game as φ(x) < x for x≪ 1, see also
Fig. 1. This implies that any finite w guarantees evolutionary
stability in the limit N → ∞. Hence, Nw ≫ 1 leads back
to the traditional concept of evolutionary stability as obtained
above for the Moran process.
IV. THE FREQUENCY DEPENDENT WRIGHT FISHER
PROCESS
As a third example, we consider the frequency dependent
Wright-Fisher process, in which individuals reproduce pro-
portional to their fitness fA = 1 − w + wpiA, similar to the
Moran process. However, here reproduction is not directly
connected to death. Instead, the new generation is sampled at
random from a large population constituted by the offspring of
all individuals. Hence, each time step corresponds to an en-
tire generation with N time steps in the Moran process. The
dynamics of this process is given by the transition matrix [22]
Ti→j =
(
N
j
)(
ifA
ifA + (N−i)fB
)j(
(N−i)fB
ifA + (N−i)fB
)N−j
resulting from binomial sampling. As this matrix is not tri-
diagonal, we explicitly derive a(x) and b(x). The drift term is
given by a(x) = 〈xt+∆t − xt〉/∆t, where ∆t is the time step
and xt is the fraction of A individuals at time t, xt = it/N .
With ∆t = 1/N , this yields
a(x) ≈ Nx(1 − x)
fA(x) − fB(x)
xfA(x) + (1− x)fB(x)
. (18)
Similarly, the diffusion b2(x) = 〈(xt+∆t − xt)2〉/∆t is
b2(x) ≈ x(1 − x) (19)
×
fA(x) fB(x) +Nx(1− x)(fA(x) − fB(x))
2
(xfA(x) + (1− x)fB(x))
2 .
Again, we first consider weak selection. The population
size enters in the diffusion term as Nw2. Hence, for weak
selection Nw2 ≪ 1 is required (in contrast to the processes
discussed above, where Nw ≪ 1 was sufficient). For weak
selection, the diffusion term becomes b(x) =
√
x(1− x)
whereas the drift term is a(x) = Nx(1−x) (fA(x)− fB(x)).
Hence, Γ(x) ≈ 2Nw (piA − piB), which is up to a factor 2
identical to the corresponding equation for the Moran process,
cf. Eq. (9). Consequently, all results for weak selection, trans-
fer to the frequency dependent Wright-Fisher process. In par-
ticular, Eqs. (10) and (11) are obtained again, i.e. the 1/3- rule
is fulfilled, as shown by a different approach in [22].
For w ≪ 1 and Nw ≫ 1, the argumentation can be trans-
ferred directly from the Moran process, which leads to a vi-
olation of the 1/3-rule again. In other words, selection never
favors one strategy replacing the other in coordination games
with finite w and N → ∞ as illustrated in Fig. 1. Therefore,
the traditional ESS concept is sufficient in this limit.
5V. FIXATION TIMES
So far, we have only considered fixation probabilities.
However, when the conditional average fixation time T (x0)
for fixation in x = 1 starting at x0 becomes very large, fix-
ation probabilities are of limited interest. For systems de-
scribed by Eq. (5), they can be computed in an elegant way
based on the Backward Kolmogorow equation [25]. In partic-
ular, T (x0) is given by
T (x0) = N
∫ 1
0
t(x, x0)dx, (20)
where time is measured in elementary time steps and
t(x, x0) =
2(1− φ(x0))φ(x)
φ(x0)b2(x)
e
∫
x
0
Γ(z)dzS(x) 0 ≤ x ≤ x0
t(x, x0) =
2φ(x)
b2(x)
e
∫
x
0
Γ(z)dz(S(1)− S(x)) x0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
For neutral selection, w = 0, we have S(x) = φ(x) = x,
and b(x) =
√
2x(1 − x)/N for the Moran process. T (x0) is
given by
T (x0) = −N
2 (1/x0 − 1) ln(1− x0). (21)
For x0 = 1/N and large N , this reduces to T (1/N) ≈
N(N − 1), which is identical to the result given in [28]. For
the local update process, we obtain T (1/N) ≈ 2N(N−1) for
N ≫ 1. Similarly, the Wright-Fisher process yields b(x) =√
x(1 − x), which results in the time T (1/N) ≈ 2(N − 1).
For w > 0, the fixation times can be computed from the inte-
gral Eq. (20). As this can only be done numerically in general,
two examples are given in Fig. (2), where the asymptotics de-
rived in [28] for the Moran process with w = 1 is found for all
three processes. Since any w < 1 can be mapped to w = 1,
this asymptotics is of general validity [30].
VI. SUMMARY
We have shown how to naturally relate the concept of ESSN
and ESS. In this context, the quantity Nw, i.e. the intensity of
selection times the population size, plays the role of an or-
der parameter which determines the concept of evolutionary
stability under consideration. Similarly, in population genet-
ics the product of fitness difference and population size is the
relevant parameter [25, 29]. For Nw ≪ 1 we find that the
1/3-rule discussed by Nowak et al. [17] for the Moran pro-
cess is generally valid and extends from the consideration of
a single mutant to the more general case of the invasion of
a small number of mutants. Moreover, the concept of evolu-
tionary stability in finite populations extends to other coevo-
lutionary processes beyond the scope of the frequency depen-
dent Moran process. However, for fixed w and N ≫ 1, this
concept is replaced by the traditional concept of evolutionary
stability. We have demonstrated that the transition between
these concepts is continuous, although the function that links
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FIG. 2: (color online) For a game with mixed Nash equilibrium (pay-
off matrix given in the figure), the conditional average fixation time
for a single mutant T (1/N) increases exponentially with the pop-
ulation size even for weak selection, w = 0.001 (symbols). The
fixation times for the local update process (filled squares) and the
Wright-Fisher process (triangles) are indistinguishable (Note, how-
ever, that the intrinsic time-scales differ by a factor N, see text). The
corresponding fixation times for the Moran process (circles) increase
slower, but still exponentially. Lines: For a coordination game (pay-
off matrix given in the figure, w = 0.1), the conditional average
fixation time for a single mutant T (1/N) decreases slower than ex-
ponentially for the Moran process (full line), the local update (dashed
line), and the Wright-Fisher process (dotted line). Specifically, for
the Moran process it has been shown that it increases as ∼ N lnN
[28].
both processes may be distinct for different processes. The
results for the fixation times match perfectly with this picture:
Whenever selection leads to a pure strategy, fixation is faster
than for neutral selection [28]. However, in games with mixed
Nash equilibria, the time for the fixation of a pure strategy in-
creases exponentially with N , which is consistent with a very
fast decay of the stationary distribution of the Moran process
[30] and the prediction of the replicator dynamics that the pure
strategies are unstable fixed points.
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